This study develops a Schumpeterian growth model with heterogeneous households and heterogeneous …rms to explore the e¤ects of monetary policy on innovation and income inequality. Household heterogeneity arises from an unequal distribution of wealth. Firm heterogeneity arises from random quality improvements and a cost of entry. We …nd that under endogenous …rm entry, in ‡ation has inverted-U e¤ects on economic growth and income inequality. We also calibrate the model for a quantitative analysis and …nd that the model is able to match the growth-maximizing in ‡ation rate and the inequalitymaximizing in ‡ation rate that we estimate using cross-country panel data. Finally, we simulate the utility-maximizing level of in ‡ation and explore how it is a¤ected by the wealth holdings of households.
Introduction
The seminal study by Tobin (1965) initiated an in ‡uential literature in macroeconomics that explores the relationship between in ‡ation and economic growth. Studies in this literature have focused on how in ‡ation a¤ects economic growth via the accumulation of physical capital and/or human capital. 1 However, an important insight from the seminal study by Solow (1956) is that economic growth is ultimately driven by technological progress. Therefore, it is important to also understand the e¤ects of in ‡ation in a growth model with endogenous technological progress. Marquis and Re¤ett (1994) explore the e¤ects of in ‡ation in the R&D-based growth model developed by Romer (1990) . However, this early study by Marquis and Re¤ett (1994) and many subsequent studies in this branch of the literature have mostly focused on a representativehousehold setting with homogeneous …rms. In this study, we …nd that the interdependence between heterogeneous households and heterogeneous …rms leads to novel results.
Speci…cally, we develop a monetary Schumpeterian growth model with heterogeneous …rms and heterogenous households. We model …rm heterogeneity in the Schumpeterian qualityladder model by assuming that the step size of quality improvements is randomly drawn from a Pareto distribution. Then, to allow for endogenous …rm entry, we assume that R&D entrepreneurs need to pay an entry cost to enter the market after observing the step size of their quality improvements. As a result, an entrepreneur would enter the market if and only if her quality improvement is su¢ciently large, which in turn generates an endogenous distribution of quality improvements that are implemented. Motivated by the empirical evidence in Piketty (2014), we consider an unequal distribution of wealth as an important source of income inequality. Therefore, we model household heterogeneity in the Schumpeterian model by assuming that households have di¤erent levels of wealth in order to generate an endogenous income distribution. Within this growth-theoretic framework, we explore the e¤ects of monetary policy on innovation and income inequality. In summary, we …nd that in ‡ation has inverted-U e¤ects on economic growth and income inequality under endogenous …rm entry.
The inverted-U e¤ect of in ‡ation on economic growth under endogenous entry of heterogeneous …rms can be explained as follows. In ‡ation increases the cost of R&D via the cashin-advance (CIA) constraint on R&D and decreases the arrival rate of innovation, which is a negative e¤ect of in ‡ation on economic growth. 2 The lower rate of creative destruction however increases the expected value of future pro…ts and the market value of inventions, which in turn lowers the entry threshold for quality improvements. With more inventions being implemented, in ‡ation also has a positive e¤ect on economic growth. These positive and negative e¤ects together generate an inverted-U e¤ect of in ‡ation on economic growth so long as the entry cost is su¢ciently large.
Interestingly, this inverted-U e¤ect of in ‡ation on economic growth also leads to an inverted-U e¤ect of in ‡ation on income inequality in the Schumpeterian model. In our model, income inequality is increasing in the ratio of wealth income to wage income. Therefore, either an increase in the real interest rate or an increase in the value of …nancial assets would increase income inequality. Given the Euler equation under which the real interest rate is increasing in the growth rate of consumption, the abovementioned inverted-U e¤ect of in ‡ation on economic growth causes an inverted-U e¤ect on the real interest rate and hence also an inverted-U e¤ect on income inequality. Furthermore, in ‡ation has both positive and negative e¤ects on the value of …nancial assets. On the one hand, by slowing down the rate of creative destruction, in ‡ation increases the market value of monopolistic …rms, which in turn increases the value of …nancial assets. On the other hand, by lowering the entry threshold for quality improvements, in ‡ation reduces the average step size of quality improvements implemented in the market and decreases the average markup ratio, which in turn decreases the market values of monopolistic …rms and …nancial assets. Combining all these e¤ects yields an overall inverted-U e¤ect of in ‡ation on income inequality, which exists only under endogenous entry of heterogeneous …rms. We also calibrate the model to perform a quantitative analysis and …nd that our model is able to match a growth-maximizing in ‡ation rate of 5% and an inequality-maximizing in ‡ation rate of 12% that are estimated using cross-country panel data. Finally, we simulate the utility-maximizing level of in ‡ation and explore how it is a¤ected by the wealth holdings of households.
This study relates to the literature on innovation and economic growth. Romer (1990) develops the seminal R&D-based growth model in which economic growth is driven by the invention of new products. Segerstrom et al. (1990) , Grossman and Helpman (1991) and Aghion and Howitt (1992) develop the Schumpeterian quality-ladder model in which economic growth is driven by the innovation of higher-quality products. For tractability, these seminal studies and many subsequent studies assume a constant step size of quality improvement. Important exceptions include Klette and Kortum (2004) and Minniti et al. (2013) . Minniti et al. (2013) develop a Schumpeterian growth model with random step sizes of quality improvements drawn from a Pareto distribution. 3 This study extends the elegant model in Minniti et al. (2013) by allowing for a Hopenhayn-Melitz-type entry cost to generate endogenous entry of heterogeneous …rms 4 and introducing heterogenous households with di¤erent asset holdings. In other words, this study contributes to the literature by developing a Schumpeterian growth model with two dimensions of heterogeneity among households and …rms.
This study also relates to the literature on innovation and in ‡ation. In this literature, the seminal study by Marquis and Re¤ett (1994) . 5 However, all these studies feature a constant step size of quality improvement. As a result, these studies predict a monotonic relationship between in ‡ation and economic growth, which is di¤erent from the inverted-U relationship between in ‡ation and economic growth often found in empirical studies. 6 As a result, Chu et al. 4 See also Baldwin and Robert-Nicoud (2008), Haruyama and Zhao (2008) and Gustafsson and Segerstrom (2010) who adapt a similar entry cost into the R&D-based growth model with heterogeneous …rms, but they do not consider random increments on the quality ladder. 5 See also Funk and Kromen (2010), Benigno and Fornaro (2018) and Oikawa and Ueda (2018) , who consider sticky prices in the Schumpeterian growth model. Our study assumes ‡exible prices in order to focus on the e¤ects of in ‡ation on long-run growth. 6 See for example Bick (2010) and Lopez-Villavicencio and Mignon (2011) for recent studies. 7 See also Arawatari et al. (2018) and Hori (2018) who consider monetary policy in the presence of heterogeneity in the productivity of R&D entrepreneurs.
they show that their model can generate an inverted-U relationship between in ‡ation and economic growth and match empirical estimates of the growth-maximizing in ‡ation rate under plausible parameter values. However, all the abovementioned studies feature a representative household; therefore, they cannot be used to analyze the implications of monetary policy on the income distribution. Therefore, this study introduces heterogeneous households into this literature in order to analyze the e¤ects of monetary policy on income inequality in addition to innovation and economic growth.
This study also relates to the literature on innovation and income inequality. Representative studies include Chou and Talmain (1996) , Li (1998) , Zweimuller (2000) , Foellmi and Zweimuller (2006) , Kiedaisch (2017) , Aghion et al. (2018) , Grossman and Helpman (2018) and Jones and Kim (2018) . These studies focus on the relationship between income inequality and innovation. Our study complements these interesting studies by exploring the e¤ects of monetary policy on innovation and income inequality. Chu and Cozzi (2018) explore the e¤ects of R&D subsidies and patent policy on income inequality, but not monetary policy. More importantly, Chu and Cozzi (2018) focus on a Schumpeterian growth model with a constant step size of quality improvement. We show that endogenous entry of heterogeneous …rms is necessary for the emergence of an inverted-U e¤ect of in ‡ation on income inequality that is consistent with our empirical …nding. 8 In the New Keynesian literature, recent studies such as McKay and Reis (2016) and Kaplan et al. (2018) introduce heterogeneous agents into the standard New Keynesian model to explore the e¤ects of government policies on inequality via nominal rigidity. In the New Monetarist literature, studies have also introduced heterogeneous agents into the search-theoretic monetary model to explore the e¤ects of in ‡ation on inequality via search and matching frictions; see Rocheteau et al. (2018) for a recent study and a discussion of earlier studies. Our study di¤ers from these interesting studies by exploring the e¤ects of in ‡ation on inequality in a monetary Schumpeterian growth model with heterogeneous agents in which in ‡ation a¤ects inequality via R&D and innovation. In other words, we focus on the long-run e¤ects of monetary policy on the macroeconomy, which complement the interesting e¤ects, emphasized by the New Keynesian model and the search-theoretic monetary model, at di¤erent time horizons.
The rest of this study is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model and solves the market equilibrium of the aggregate economy. Section 3 explores the distributions of wealth and income. Section 4 analyzes the e¤ects of monetary policy. Section 5 provides a quantitative analysis. Section 6 concludes. Proofs are relegated to the appendix.
A Schumpeterian model with heterogeneous …rms and heterogeneous households
The Schumpeterian quality-ladder model is based on Aghion and Howitt (1992) and Grossman and Helpman (1991 
Households
There is a unit continuum of households, which are indexed by h 2 [0; 1]. They have identical homothetic preferences over consumption c t (h) but own di¤erent levels of wealth. 10 Household h has the following utility function:
where the parameter > 0 is the subjective discount rate. Household h supplies one unit of labor to earn wage income w t and maximizes utility u(h) subject to
a t (h) is the real value of …nancial assets (i.e., equity of monopolistic …rms) owned by household h, and r t is the real interest rate. m t (h) is the real value of cash holdings of household h, and t is the in ‡ation rate. b t (h) is the amount of cash borrowed from household h by entrepreneurs for R&D, and i t is the nominal interest rate. 11 The CIA constraint is given by b t (h) m t (h). Finally, the government provides a lump-sum transfer t to each household. 12 From standard dynamic optimization, household h's consumption path is given by
which shows that the growth rate of consumption is the same across households such that
c t (h)dh denotes aggregate consumption. Therefore, the growth rate of aggregate consumption is also given by
10 Due to the households' homothetic preferences, the aggregate economy behaves as if there is a representative household; see for example Caselli and Ventura (2000) . Nevertheless, the heterogeneity in wealth holdings still enables us to explore the endogenous distribution of income. 11 It can be shown as a no-arbitrage condition that the rate of return on borrowing b t (h) must equal r t + t . 12 The transfer is …nanced by seigniorage. Alternatively, we can assume that seigniorage is used to …nance a public good, in which case all our analytical results would be the same so long as the (potentially utilityenhancing) public good is non-productive.
Final good
Final good y t is produced by a unit continuum of competitive …rms using the following CobbDouglas production function:
where L t is labor input and 2 (0; 1) measures labor intensity in production. K t is a composite of a unit continuum of di¤erentiated intermediate goods k t (j) given by
From pro…t maximization using (5), the conditional demand function for L t is
From pro…t maximization using (5) and (6), the conditional demand function for k t (j) is
where p t (j) is the price of k t (j). 
Intermediate goods
There is a unit continuum of industries indexed by j 2 [0; 1]. In each industry j, there is a monopolistic industry leader, who holds a patent on the latest technology and dominates the market until the arrival of the next innovation. 14 The production function of the leader in industry j is
where q t (j; ! j ) is the quality-level of the leader in industry j and ! j is an integer denoting the quality vintage of the intermediate goods produced by the leader in industry j. x t (j) is the quantity of input j produced using …nal good with an one-to-one technology (i.e., x t (j) units of …nal good produce x t (j) units of input j). From Bertrand competition, the equilibrium price of k t (j) is a markup over the marginal cost 1=q t (j; ! j ) given by
where the markup ratio t (j) q t (j; ! j )=q t (j; ! j 1) is determined by the size of the quality improvement by the leader in industry j. The equilibrium level of monopolistic pro…t is
R&D and entry
In this section, we present the three steps of innovation. First, an entrepreneur invents a higher quality product. Then, the size of the quality improvement is randomly drawn from a Pareto distribution. Finally, if and only if the quality improvement is su¢ciently large, then the entrepreneur would pay a …xed entry cost to enter the market.
Invention
R&D is performed by competitive entrepreneurs. If an entrepreneur employs R t (j) units of …nal good to engage in innovation in industry j, then she would succeed in inventing the next higher-quality product in the industry with an instantaneous probability t (j) given by
To ensure balanced growth, t Q
(1 )= t measuring the di¢culty of R&D is increasing the aggregate technology level Q t , 15 which is de…ned as
To facilitate the payment of R t (j), the entrepreneur needs to borrow the amount R t (j) of cash from households, where 2 (0; 1] is the CIA parameter. The borrowing cost is determined by the nominal interest rate i t . Therefore, the total cost of R&D is (1 + i t )R t (j). Let's use v e t (j; ! j + 1) to denote the expected value of an invention before the realization of the size of its quality improvement. The R&D condition is given by
Random quality improvements
We follow Minniti et al. (2013) to assume that when an R&D entrepreneur invents a higherquality product in industry j, the quality step size t (j) > 1 is randomly drawn from a stationary Pareto distribution with the following probability density function:
where the parameter 2 (0; 1) determines the shape of the Pareto distribution. Given that the expected value of t (j) is equal across industries, (11) implies that the expected value e t (j) of monopolistic pro…t t (j) is also the same across industries such that e t (j) = e t for j 2 [0; 1]. Therefore, we follow the standard treatment to focus on the symmetric equilibrium in which the arrival rate of innovation is equal across industries, such that t (j) = t for j 2 [0; 1]. 16 As a result, the expected value of an invention does not depend on j such that v e t (j; ! j + 1) = v e t for j 2 [0; 1]. 15 Venturini (2012) provides empirical evidence for the presence of increasing R&D di¢culty. 16 Cozzi et al. (2007) provide a theoretical justi…cation for the symmetric equilibrium to be the unique rational-expectation equilibrium in the Schumpeterian model.
Endogenous …rm entry
Following Hopenhayn (1992) and Melitz (2003) , we consider a …xed entry cost to generate an endogenous entry of heterogeneous …rms. Let's denote v t ( ) as the ex post value of an invention (i.e., after the realization of the quality step size ). In this case, the entry condition is
where the entry cost t = Q
(1 )= t is proportional to Q
(1 )= t to ensure balanced growth. Given that t ( ) is increasing in , there exists a threshold quality level~ t above which v t ( ) t for all ~ t . Also, it can be shown that v t ( )=Q
(1 )= t is stationary in equilibrium. Then, Lemma 1 shows that the threshold quality level~ in v t (~ ) = t is stationary.
Lemma 1 There exists a unique and stationary threshold quality level~ t =~ for all t.
Proof. See Appendix A.
Given the stationary threshold~ , Lemma 2 derives the no-arbitrage condition for the expected value v e t of an invention. In (17) , Pr( ~ ) =~ 1= is the probability that a randomly drawn quality step size is larger than the threshold~ .
Lemma 2 The no-arbitrage condition for the expected value v e t of an invention is
Monetary authority
We consider the nominal interest rate i t as the policy instrument, which is exogenously set by the monetary authority. The Fisher equation is given by i t = t + r t , where t _ P t =P t is the in ‡ation rate and P t is the price level of …nal good. Given the aggregate nominal money balance M t P t m t , the growth rate of the aggregate nominal money balance is
where the last equality uses the aggregate consumption path in (4) . It can be shown that given a stationary nominal interest rate i, aggregate consumption c t and aggregate real money balance m t grow at the same rate on the balanced growth path. Therefore, on the balanced growth path, the growth rate of the nominal money balance is determined by the nominal interest rate such that = i . The government uses the seigniorage revenue _ M t to …nance a lump-sum transfer t that has a real value given by
which yields t = (i ) m t on the balanced growth path.
Decentralized equilibrium
The equilibrium is a time path of allocations fc t (h); a t (h); m t (h); b t (h); y t ; L t ; k t (j); x t (j); R t (j)g, a time path of prices fw t ; r t ; p t (j); v t ( )g and a time path of policies fi t ; t g. Also, at each instance of time, the following conditions hold:
household h 2 [0; 1] maximizes utility taking fw t ; r t ; i t ; t g as given;
competitive …rms produce …nal good y t to maximize pro…t taking prices as given; monopolistic …rm j 2 [0; 1] produces intermediate good k t (j) and chooses fx t (i); p t (j)g to maximize pro…t;
competitive R&D entrepreneurs choose R t (j) to maximize expected pro…t taking v t ( ) as given;
the market-clearing condition for labor holds such that L t = 1;
the market-clearing condition for …nal good holds such that
the total amount of cash owned by households equals the amount of cash borrowed by entrepreneurs such that
the total value of assets owned by households equals the value of all monopolistic …rms such that
the monetary authority uses seigniorage to …nance a lump-sum transfer t = _ M t =P t .
Aggregate economy
First, we derive the growth rate of aggregate technology Q t by di¤erentiating the log of (13) with respect to time and using the law of large numbers:
where the truncated density functionf ( ) as a result of the threshold~ is de…ned as
In (20),~
1=
t is the composite arrival rate of implementable quality improvements and +ln~ is the average step size of implemented quality improvements. Then, we derive the aggregate production function for y t in the following lemma:
Lemma 3 The aggregate production function for y t is given by
The aggregate production function in (22) implies that the growth rate of aggregate output y t is given by
where the last equality uses (20) . Lemma 4 shows that given a stationary nominal interest rate i, the aggregate economy jumps to a unique and stable balanced growth path along which and g are also stationary.
Lemma 4
The aggregate economy jumps to a unique and stable balanced growth path.
The no-arbitrage condition for the ex-post value of an invention with ~ is given by
where the last equality uses the aggregate consumption path in (4) and the property that c t and v t both grow at the steady-state equilibrium growth rate in (23) . Then, substituting (11) and (24) into the entry condition v t (~ ) = Q
(1 )= t
, we obtain
From (17), the equilibrium value of v e t on the balanced growth path is determined by
where the last equality uses the aggregate consumption path in (4) and the property that c t , v e t and t all grow at the steady-state equilibrium growth rate in (23) . The expected value of monopolistic pro…t is given by
Substituting (26) and (27) into the R&D condition in (14) yields "~ 1=(1 + )
Combining (25) and (28), we obtain the following condition:
where the left-hand side is monotonically increasing in~ . Therefore, (29) implicitly determines the unique equilibrium value of~ as a decreasing function in the nominal interest rate i. Using (22), (25) and (29), we obtain the following condition:
which determines the unique equilibrium value of the composite innovation rate~
1=
. The right-hand side of (30) is decreasing in the nominal interest rate i for a given value of~ ; however, is also decreasing in i. Therefore, the overall e¤ect of i on~
is ambiguous. The following proposition summarizes the overall e¤ects of i on~ 1= and g.
Proposition 1
If the entry cost parameter is su¢ciently large (small), then the nominal interest rate i has an inverted-U e¤ect (a monotonically negative) on the composite innovation rate~ 1= and the equilibrium growth rate g.
Intuitively, when the entry cost is zero, the nominal interest rate i has no e¤ect on the distribution of quality improvements that are implemented because all …rms enter the market. In this case, the entry threshold becomes~ = 1, and the equilibrium growth rate g = 1 is monotonically decreasing in the nominal interest rate i via the innovation arrival rate . However, when the entry cost is positive, the nominal interest rate i a¤ects the entry threshold in addition to the innovation arrival rate . In this case, Pr( ~ ) =~ 1= is increasing in the nominal interest rate i because an increase in the nominal interest rate i reduces the entry threshold~ and leads to more quality improvements being implemented. Intuitively, the nominal interest rate i has a negative e¤ect on the arrival rate of future innovations, which in turn increases the expected value of the pro…t stream generated by an implemented quality improvement and decreases the minimum quality step size that makes incurring the entry cost pro…table. Overall, the e¤ects of the nominal interest rate i on the composite innovation ratẽ 1= and the equilibrium growth rate g = 1 (ln~ + )~ 1= become ambiguous and follow an inverted-U pattern when the entry cost is su¢ciently large.
Wealth distribution
In equilibrium, household h 2 [0; 1] lends all its cash to entrepreneurs such that m t (h) = b t (h). Substituting this condition into (2) yields
where we have also used the Fisher equation r t = i t t . Aggregating (31) for all h, we have
Let's denote z t (h) a t (h) + b t (h) as household h's wealth, which consists of …nancial assets and bond holdings. Then, we de…ne s z;0 (h) z 0 (h)=z 0 as the initial share of wealth owned by household h, and s z;0 (h) is exogenously given at time 0. We consider a general distribution function of initial wealth share with a mean of one and a standard deviation of z > 0.
Taking the log of wealth share s z;t (h) z t (h)=z t at time t and di¤erentiating the resulting expression with respect to time yield
Then, (33) can be re-expressed as
where s c;t (h) c t (h)=c t is the share of consumption by household h at time t. Taking the log of s c;t (h) and di¤erentiating the resulting expression with respect to time yield
Given that _ c t (h)=c t (h) = _ c t =c t from (3) and (4), (35) becomes _ s c;t (h) = 0 for all t, which in turn implies s c;t (h) = s c;0 (h) for all t. 17 Given that fa t ; b t ; z t ; c t ; w t ; t g all grow at the same rate g in equilibrium, (34) represents a one-dimensional di¤erential equation, which describes the potential evolution of s z;t (h) given an initial s z;0 (h). In Appendix A, we show that the coe¢cient on s z;t (h) in (34) is positive and equal to . Together with the fact that s z;t (h) is a state variable, the only solution consistent with long-run stability is _ s z;t (h) = 0 for all t, which is achieved by consumption share s c;t (h) jumping to its steady-state value shown in Appendix A. Lemma 5 shows that as an equilibrium outcome, the wealth distribution is stationary and remains the same as the initial distribution, which is exogenously given at time 0. 18 Lemma 5 The wealth share of household h 2 [0; 1] is given by s z;t (h) = s z;0 (h) for all t.
Income distribution
From (31) , income earned by household h is given by
Aggregating (36) yields total income earned by all households given by
Combining (36) and (37) yields the share of income earned by household h given by
which also uses z t (h) = s z;t (h)z t = s z;0 (h)z t from Lemma 5. The distribution function of income share s I;t (h) has a mean of one and the following standard deviation:
which is also the coe¢cient of variation of income and is increasing in r t z t =w t . As discussed in Chu and Cozzi (2018), income inequality I;t is increasing in r t z t =w t because an unequal distribution of wealth is the source of income inequality in the model. Therefore, whenever interest income r t z t increases relative to wage income w t , the degree of income inequality increases.
Lemma 6 Income inequality is increasing in the ratio of interest income to wage income.
Proof. Equation (39) shows that I;t is increasing in r t z t =w t .
Recall that total wealth is given by z t = a t + b t . The amount of …nancial assets a t in the economy is given by
which uses (7), (22) and (40), we derive a w
The amount of borrowing b t in the economy is given by
where the last equality uses (12) . Using (7), (22) and (42), we derive
Using (4), (41) and (43), we derive the ratio of total interest income to wage income as
where the growth rate g, the quality threshold~ and the innovation arrival rate are determined by (23) , (29) and (30), respectively.
Monetary policy on growth and inequality
In this section, we explore the e¤ects of monetary policy on economic growth and income inequality. We begin by exploring the relationship between the in ‡ation rate and the nominal interest rate. From the Fisher equation, the in ‡ation rate is given by
where the last equality uses (4). Di¤erentiating the steady-state equilibrium in ‡ation rate in (45) with respect to the nominal interest rate i yields
Therefore, so long as @g(i)=@i < 1, the relationship between the steady-state equilibrium in‡ation rate and the nominal interest rate is positive. 19 This positive long-run relationship between the in ‡ation rate and the nominal interest rate is supported by empirical studies such as Mishkin (1992) and Booth and Ciner (2001) . In the following sections, we explore the effects of the nominal interest rate on economic growth and income inequality. It is useful to note that any relationship between the nominal interest rate and growth/inequality would also apply to in ‡ation and growth/inequality given the positive relationship between in ‡ation and the nominal interest rate.
Monetary policy under a zero entry cost
We …rst consider the case of a zero entry cost = 0. In this case, the threshold quality level becomes~ = 1. Then, the equilibrium growth rate in (23) becomes g = 1 , where the innovation arrival rate in (30) simpli…es to
which is decreasing in the nominal interest rate i. As for the e¤ect of the nominal interest rate i on income inequality, we know from Lemma 6 that we simply have to examine how i a¤ects the ratio of total interest income to wage income in (44) . We begin by examining separately the e¤ects of i on ra=w and rb=w. Under a zero entry cost, the ratio of asset interest income to wage income simpli…es to
which uses (4), (41) and (47) . Recall that the innovation arrival rate is decreasing in the nominal interest rate i. Therefore, (48) shows that the nominal interest rate i has two opposing e¤ects on the ratio ra=w of asset interest income to wage income. First, an increase in i reduces the real interest rate r = + 1 by decreasing innovation and the equilibrium growth rate. This corresponds to the interest-rate e¤ect of innovation on income inequality identi…ed in Chu and Cozzi (2018) , who consider R&D subsidies instead of monetary policy. Second, an increase in i reduces the rate of creative destruction and raises the asset-wage ratio a=w. This corresponds to the asset-value e¤ect of innovation on income inequality in Chu and Cozzi (2018) . Equation (48) shows that as ! 0, the two e¤ects cancel each other. For the more general case with > 0, di¤erentiating ra=w in (48) with respect to i yields the following result:
Therefore, the positive asset-value e¤ect of i on income inequality dominates the negative interest-rate e¤ect of i on income inequality if and only if < =(1 ). This result generalizes the one in Chu and Cozzi (2018) , who consider a symmetric quality step size and …nd that the asset-value e¤ect of R&D subsidies dominates the interest-rate e¤ect of R&D subsidies if and only if the quality step size is su¢ciently small. In the case of asymmetric quality step sizes, the average quality step size is increasing in . Therefore, a small value of implies a small average quality step size, under which the asset-value e¤ect dominates the interest-rate e¤ect of monetary policy on income inequality.
Under a zero entry cost, the ratio of bond interest income to wage income simpli…es to
which uses (4) and (43) . Equation (50) shows that the ratio rb=w of bond interest income to wage income is increasing in the innovation arrival rate , which in turn is decreasing in the nominal interest rate i. The …rst negative e¤ect is that an increase in i reduces the real interest rate r = + 1 by decreasing innovation and the equilibrium growth rate. The second negative e¤ect is that an increase in i decreases R&D and the amount of borrowing, which in turn decreases the bond-wage ratio b=w.
Combining (48) and (50) yields the ratio of total interest income to wage income given by
As ! 0, the two e¤ects of the nominal interest rate i on the ratio ra=w of asset interest income to wage income cancel each other. In this case, we are left with the negative e¤ects of i on the ratio rb=w of bond interest income to wage income. For the more general case in which > 0, the overall e¤ect of i on rz=w depends on the relative value of and =(1 ). If > =(1 ), then the e¤ects of i on ra=w and rb=w are both negative. In this case, the overall e¤ect of the nominal interest rate on income inequality is negative. If < =(1 ), then the e¤ect of i on ra=w is positive whereas the e¤ect of i on rb=w is negative. In this case, the overall e¤ect of the nominal interest rate on income inequality can be positive, negative or U-shaped. Proposition 2 summarizes these results.
Proposition 2 Given a zero entry cost parameter , an increase in the nominal interest rate has the following e¤ects: (a) it has a negative e¤ect on income inequality if > =(1 ) and (b) it may have a positive, negative or U-shaped e¤ect on income inequality if < =(1 ).
Monetary policy under a positive entry cost
We now consider the general case of a positive entry cost > 0. Recall that the e¤ects of the nominal interest rate on income inequality depend on how it a¤ects the ratio of total interest income to wage income, which depends on r, a=w and b=w. Proposition 1 shows that the nominal interest rate has an inverted-U e¤ect on the equilibrium growth rate under a su¢ciently large entry cost . Therefore, the nominal interest rate also has an inverted-U e¤ect on the real interest rate r = + g under a su¢ciently large entry cost . It is useful to note that this interest-rate e¤ect works through the quality threshold~ in addition to the innovation arrival rate in the previous section and in Chu and Cozzi (2018) . We now consider how the nominal interest rate a¤ects the asset-wage ratio a=w. Substituting (29) and (30) into (41) yields
where the quality threshold~ > 1 is determined by (29) and decreasing in the nominal interest rate i. In the previous section with = 0, the quality threshold is simply~ = 1. In this special case, the positive asset-value e¤ect works through the innovation arrival rate , which in turn is decreasing in i. However, in the more general case with > 0, the asset-value e¤ect also works through the quality threshold~ via two channels. First, as explained in the discussion of Proposition 1, an increase in the nominal interest rate i reduces the entry quality threshold~ , which in turn leads to more innovations being implemented and increases~ 1= in the composite creative destruction rate~
1=
. This e¤ect works to decrease a=w as shown in (52) . Second, the lower average quality step size also reduces the average markup ratio and the average value of monopolistic …rms, which in turn decreases a=w. It is useful to note that these negative asset-value e¤ects have the opposite sign as the one in the previous section by working through a di¤erent channel that is the quality threshold~ , which is absent in Chu and Cozzi (2018) .
We now consider how the nominal interest rate a¤ects the bond-wage ratio b=w. Substituting (29) and (30) into (43) yields
Equation (53) shows that the nominal interest rate i a¤ects b=w through~ via multiple channels. The main e¤ect is similar to and complements the one in the previous section but once again works through a di¤erent channel that the nominal interest rate reduces the quality threshold and the average quality step size, which in turn decreases the average markup ratio and the expected value of monopolistic pro…ts. This general-equilibrium e¤ect in turn reinforces the direct negative direct of i on R&D and the amount of borrowing as well as the bond-wage ratio b=w.
In Section 4.1, we …nd that in the case of a zero entry cost = 0 and a positive discount rate > 0, an increase in the nominal interest rate has both positive and negative e¤ects on income inequality. In this section, we …nd that in the case of a positive entry cost > 0, an increase in the nominal interest rate has additional e¤ects on income inequality via endogenous …rm entry. Therefore, when the entry cost and the discount rate are both positive and the CIA parameter , which determines the e¤ects of the nominal interest rate, is su¢ciently large, we …nd that an increase in the nominal interest rate has a potentially inverted-U e¤ect on income inequality. Speci…cally, Proposition 3 shows that the e¤ect of the nominal interest rate on income inequality is …rstly increasing and eventually decreasing.
Proposition 3
If the product of the discount rate and the entry cost (i.e., ) is positive and the CIA parameter is su¢ciently large, then income inequality is …rstly increasing and eventually decreasing in the nominal interest rate i.
Proof. See Appendix A.
It is important to note that this inverted-U e¤ect of the nominal interest rate on income inequality is di¤erent from the U-shaped e¤ect under a zero entry cost = 0 in Proposition 2. Therefore, without the entry cost, it is impossible for the model to generate an inverted-U e¤ect on income inequality. The reason is that as Proposition 1 shows, the nominal interest rate has an inverted-U e¤ect on the equilibrium growth rate if and only if the entry cost is su¢ciently large. In other words, endogenous …rm entry is necessary for the emergence of an inverted-U e¤ect of the nominal interest rate on economic growth, which in turn generates an inverted-U e¤ect on income inequality that is otherwise absent without endogenous …rm entry.
The main mechanisms behind this inverted-U e¤ect on income inequality can be summarized as follows. Given that the real interest rate is increasing in the growth rate of consumption, the inverted-U e¤ect of the nominal interest rate on economic growth causes an inverted-U e¤ect on the real interest rate. Furthermore, the nominal interest rate has both positive and negative e¤ects on the value of assets. On the one hand, by slowing down the innovation arrival rate, the nominal interest rate increases the market value of monopolistic …rms, which in turn increases the value of assets. On the other hand, by lowering the entry threshold for quality improvements, the nominal interest rate reduces the average step size of implemented quality improvements and decreases the average markup ratio, which in turn decreases the market values of monopolistic …rms and assets. Combining all these e¤ects yields an overall inverted-U e¤ect of the nominal interest rate on income inequality, which exists only under endogenous entry of heterogeneous …rms.
Quantitative analysis
In this section, we provide a quantitative analysis. In Section 5.1, we use cross-country data to estimate the empirical e¤ects of in ‡ation on economic growth and income inequality. In Section 5.2, we calibrate the model to data and our regression estimates before simulating the e¤ects of in ‡ation on growth and inequality. Section 5.3 explores how the wealth holdings of households a¤ect in ‡ation and growth.
Empirical estimation
To facilitate the subsequent calibration, we …rst provide an empirical estimation of the e¤ects of in ‡ation on economic growth and income inequality. Here we use cross-country panel data to estimate the following regressions:
where g it denotes the growth rate of real GDP in country i at time t, it denotes the in ‡ation rate from the Consumer Price Index in country i at time t, and it denotes income inequality in country i at time t. The Gini index, which is a conventional measure of income inequality, is collected from the World Income Inequality Database (WIID) version 3.4. This database also provides information on the income share of each decile group; e.g., the …rst decile group includes the poorest 10% of the population, whereas the tenth decile group includes the richest 10%. We calculate the ratio of income between the top group and the bottom group as an alternative measure of income inequality. X it is a vector of the following control variables: a constant, the degree of openness, the unemployment rate, and investment risks. We follow Fan and Gao (2017) to use the investment pro…le index and the corruption index from the International Country Risk Guide to measure investment risks. 20 i and i are the country …xed e¤ects. 21 Summary statistics for all variables are reported in Appendix B. To be consistent with our innovation-driven growth model, we focus on high-income countries and consider the data from 1995 to 2014. Since the di¤erence between the maximum and the minimum values of the in ‡ation rate in a few countries are too high (which are close to the value of hyperin ‡ation rate and much higher than the value of galloping in ‡ation rate), we delete the top 15% outliers. 22 In the …rst three columns, we de…ne high-income countries according to the de…nition given by the WIID. In the last three columns, we de…ne high-income countries according to the classi…cation given by the World Bank (WB). Table 1 shows that the overall e¤ects of in ‡ation on economic growth and income inequality follow an inverted-U pattern. The growth-maximizing in ‡ation rate is about 5%, 23 whereas the inequality-maximizing in ‡ation rate is about 12%. 24 One concern about our benchmark (reduced-form) regression results is that the nominal interest rate could enter both in the error term and in ‡ation, which may lead to an endogeneity problem and bias our results. To address this issue, we use the lending interest rate collected from CEIC database as an instrumental variable for the in ‡ation rate. As reported in Appendix B, the results are still robust and the threshold values are similar to the ones in Table 1 . Note: *** p < 0:01, ** p < 0:05, * p < 0:1. Standard errors are in parentheses. Columns 1 and 4 correspond to the GDP growth rate. Columns 2-3 and 5-6 use di¤erent measures of income inequality. Speci…cally, columns 2 and 5 correspond to the income di¤erence between the top 10% and the bottom 10% of the population. Columns 3 and 6 correspond to the Gini coe¢cient. In the …rst (last) three columns, high-income countries follow the classi…cation by the WIID (WB).
Calibration and simulation
To perform a more realistic quantitative analysis, we generalize the model by introducing elastic labor supply L t (h) = 1 l t (h), where l t (h) denotes leisure. The generalized utility function is
where the parameter 0 determines the importance of leisure l t (h) in utility. We also allow for external habit, measured by the parameter " 2 [0; 1], on leisure l t R 1 0 l t (h)dh. 25 Furthermore, we impose a CIA constraint on consumption as in Chu and Cozzi (2014) . With the additional cash requirement on consumption, the CIA constraint becomes b t (h) + 'c t (h) m t (h), where the parameter ' 2 [0; 1] determines the fraction of consumption spending that is subject to the CIA constraint. We provide detailed derivations of this generalized model in Appendix C.
We now calibrate the model to perform a quantitative analysis on the relationship between in ‡ation and economic growth/income inequality. The model features the following structural parameters f ; ; ; ; '; ; ; ; "g and policy instrument i. We consider a range of values for the CIA-R&D parameter 2 f0:65; 1g. 26 We set the discount rate to a conventional value of 0.05. We set the degree of labor intensity to a value of 0.56 in the US; see for example Karabarbounis and Neiman (2014) . We calibrate the leisure parameter by matching the 25 It is useful to note that the presence of external habit on leisure does not a¤ect the equilibrium allocations but only a¤ects welfare. Therefore, the parameter " enables us to explore its implications on the utility-maximizing in ‡ation rate without a¤ecting the equilibrium allocations. We do not include external habit on consumption as it is well known that it leads to a counterfactual comovement between hours worked and productivity shocks. For example, Khorunzhina (2015) …nds that the counterfactual "response of hours worked [...] disappears once habit in consumption is ruled out but habit in leisure remains". 26 We …nd that when is too small, the calibrated value of becomes greater than unity.
average fraction of time devoted to labor supply L as 0.3. We calibrate the CIA-consumption parameter ' using the M1-consumption ratio from 1990 to 2016 in the US. As for the Pareto distribution parameter , we calibrate its value by matching an average TFP growth rate g of 0.5% from 1990 to 2016 in the US. As for the R&D cost parameter and the entry cost parameter , we calibrate their values by matching the growth-maximizing in ‡ation rate and the inequality-maximizing in ‡ation rate estimated in the previous section. We calibrate the monetary policy instrument i by matching the average in ‡ation rate in the US, which is about 2.5% in the past two decades. Finally, we will consider the full range of values for the external habit parameter " 2 [0; 1] when evaluating the welfare e¤ects of in ‡ation. The calibrated parameter values are summarized in Table 2 . Figure 1 simulates the relationship between in ‡ation and economic growth. We …nd that the relationship between in ‡ation and economic growth follows an inverted-U pattern. The equilibrium growth rate is maximized at an in ‡ation rate of 5.0%. After that, any further increase in in ‡ation is associated with a decline in economic growth. For example, increasing the in ‡ation rate from 5% to 15% leads to a decrease in the equilibrium growth rate that ranges from 0.006% (in the case of = 0:65) to 0.007% (in the case of = 1). Figure 2 simulates the relationship between in ‡ation and income inequality. We …nd that the relationship between in ‡ation and income inequality also follows an inverted-U pattern. The coe¢cient of variation of income is maximized at an in ‡ation rate of 12%. When the in ‡ation rate increases from the benchmark value of 2.5% to 12%, the percent change in the coe¢cient of variation of income ranges from 0.10% (in the case of = 0:65) to 0.12% (in the case of = 1). When the in ‡ation rate is above 12%, any further increase in in ‡ation is associated with a decline in income inequality. Finally, we consider the relationship between in ‡ation and the utility of the households that have a wealth share of unity (i.e., s z;0 (h) = 1). 27 This benchmark case corresponds to social welfare in a model with a representative household. Figure 3 plots the utility-maximizing in ‡ation rates for " 2 [0; 1]. Unlike many previous studies that do not feature innovation and creative destruction, 28 the Friedman rule does not hold in our Schumpeterian model, and the welfare-maximizing nominal interest rate and in ‡ation rate are both positive. As shown in Chu and Cozzi (2014) , the Schumpeterian growth model features a negative externality of R&D in the form of a business-stealing e¤ect. Therefore, an increase in the in ‡ation rate that reduces R&D may improve welfare. Furthermore, in this Schumpeterian model with endogenous entry, an increase in the in ‡ation rate has an additional positive e¤ect on welfare by increasing the frequency of entries. Khorunzhina (2015) estimates that the degree of external habit " on leisure is about 0.95, which corresponds to a welfare-maximizing in ‡ation rate of about 14% in the case of = 1. 27 In Section 6, we will explore how the wealth share s z;0 (h) a¤ects the utility-maximizing in ‡ation rate. 28 See for example Wong (2016) for a recent study that considers a new monetarist model with heterogeneous agents and the accumulation of human capital as an endogenous growth engine.
How wealth inequality a¤ects in ‡ation and growth
In this section, we explore how the wealth share s z;0 (h) of a household determines its utilitymaximizing in ‡ation rate (h). We …nd that an increase in s z;0 (h) leads to a decrease in (h). Intuitively, given that a household's consumption is increasing in its wealth, the negative assetvalue e¤ects of in ‡ation are stronger for wealthier households, which in turn prefer a lower in ‡ation rate. Figure 4 plots the negative relationship between s z;0 (h) and (h) for the case of " = 0:95. Given that the households' preferences on the in ‡ation rate are single-peaked, the median voter theorem applies. Suppose the wealth share owned by the median household is s z;0 (m). Then, an increase in s z;0 (m) would a¤ect the equilibrium growth rate in the economy by decreasing the in ‡ation rate that is preferred by the median voter and selected in a majority-rule voting system. Figure 5 plots the relationship between s z;0 (m) and the equilibrium growth rate g (m) that corresponds to the utility-maximizing in ‡ation rate of the median household. As s z;0 (m) increases, the in ‡ation rate preferred by the median household decreases, which in turn causes the equilibrium growth rate to increase initially until reaching the growth-maximizing in ‡ation rate of 5% after which the equilibrium growth rate decreases. 
Conclusion
In this study, we have developed a Schumpeterian growth model with two dimensions of heterogeneity among households and …rms. We model household heterogeneity by assuming that households own di¤erent levels of wealth, which in turn generate an endogenous distribution of income. We model …rm heterogeneity by assuming random quality improvements and a cost of entering a market, which together generate an endogenous distribution of implemented quality improvements. Both the income distribution and the implemented quality distribution are a¤ected by monetary policy. Within this monetary growth-theoretic framework, we …nd that in‡ation has inverted-U e¤ects on both economic growth and income inequality. Furthermore, we calibrate our model to match the growth-maximizing and inequality-maximizing in ‡ation rates that are estimated using cross-country panel data. We also simulate the utility-maximizing level of in ‡ation and explore how it is a¤ected by the wealth holdings of households. Finally, our model could feature scale e¤ects as in the …rst-generation R&D-based growth model in Romer (1990) , Segerstrom et al. (1990) , Grossman and Helpman (1991) and Aghion and Howitt (1992) . 29 We sidestep this issue by normalizing the supply of labor to unity. Alternatively, one can remove scale e¤ects in the Schumpeterian growth model by considering the semi-endogenous-growth approach in Segerstrom (1998) or the second-generation approach in Peretto (1998 Peretto ( , 2007 . We leave this potentially interesting extension to future research.
where the …rst equality cancels t d(~ 1= t )=dt from both sides and the second equality uses t = Q , we modify (17) as
Similarly, we modify (24) for =~ t as
which uses the entry condition v t (~ t ) = t = Q . From (A2) and (A3), we have
where
from (11) . Using (A4)-(A6), we also havẽ
which uniquely determines~ > 1 independent of t because the left-hand side of (A7) is increasing in~ t > 1 and the right-hand side is independent of t.
Proof of Lemma 2. In the symmetric equilibrium, we have v e t (i; ! i + 1) = v e t , which can be expressed as
Substituting the no-arbitrage condition for the value of an implemented innovation
which uses (A8) and
Di¤erentiating both sides in (A10) with respect to t yields
By substituting (A11) into (A9), with v e t = (1 + i t ) t ; we can obtain
which is equivalent to (17) .
Proof of Lemma 3. Substituting (8) and (10) into (6) yields
which uses (13) for Q t . Given that t (j) >~ for implemented innovations, the truncated distribution function for implemented innovations is as follows:
By this,
holds. Substituting (A13)-(A15) into y t = K 1 t from (5) yields (22) .
Proof of Lemma 4. De…nec t c t =Q
(1 )= t : Then, from (4), it holds that
From (A3) and (A6), with v t (~ ) = t = Q
(1 )= t ; the real interest rate can be expressed as
Substituting (22) and (A17) into (A16) yields
Given (29), the right-hand side of (A18) is always decreasing in t . To obtain the equilibrium expression of t o¤ the balanced growth path, we will derive the total demand for …nal goods. First, we use (8)- (10), and to have
Then from (12), we have
Combining (A19) and (A20) with the …nal good market condition yields
which also uses (22) for y t . Finally, by substituting (A21) into (A18), we have a one-dimensional di¤erential equation inc t : Given that t decreases withc t ; the right-hand side of (A18) is increasing inc t : The dynamics ofc t is saddle-point stable; i.e.,c t jumps to the unique steadystatec at t = 0: Accordingly, (A18) determines the stationary equilibrium value of~ 1= t as in (30) . Then, (A21) determines the steady-state value ofc t as c = 1 1
(A22)
Proof of Proposition 1. By (29) and (30), we havẽ
We naturally focus on a non-trivial case where~ is an inverted-U shaped function in~ and maximized at~ = 1=(1 ): Then, < 1=(1 ) < + holds. In addition, by (29) ,~ is decreasing in i, thereby having an upper bound, denoted as , due to i 0: It is easy to verify that increases from 1 to 1 as increases from 0. When is such large that > 1= (1 ) holds, there is an inverted-U shaped relationship between i 0 and~ 1= ; noting~ monotonically decreases with i 0: Then, when is small such that < 1= (1 ) ; the relationship is monotonically negative for any i 0. Di¤erentiating (23) with respect to~ yields dg d~
where we have used (A23). Note the following properties: (a) 1 ((1=(1 ))) > 0 and 2 (1=(1 )) = 0; (b) 1 (~ ) is an uni-modal function (maximized at some~ that is higher than 1= (1 )) and 2 (~ ) is a strictly increasing function; (c) 1 ( ) = 1 ( + ) = 0; and (d) 1 (~ ) is strictly concave and 2 (~ ) is strictly convex. Taking into account these facts, with a usual graphical analysis, there must uniquely exist a threshold level of~ 2 (1= (1 ) ; + ); denoted as in the …gure, under (above) which 1 (~ ) > (<) 2 (~ ); that is, dg=d~ > (<)0: Recalling that increases with and then~ decreases with i; we can show that the relationship between i and g is also inverted-U shaped (negative) if is large (small).
Given > =(1 ), (A29) shows that d(rz=w)=d > 0. From (47), we know d =di < 0. As a result, there is a negative e¤ect of i and rz=w.
As for < =(1 ), we will show that there are three possibilities: for a feasible range of
Before proceeding, it is useful to note that there is an upper bound of since i 0 with (47), given by
We will derive a su¢cient conditions for each case, by focusing on both ends of 2 (0; + ]. First, by substituting ! 0 (i.e., the lower bound) into (A29), we can show that d(rz=w)=d > 0 holds at ! 0 if
Moreover, it is easy to derive d 2 (rz t =w t )=d 2 > 0 when < =(1 ). As a result, d(rz=w)=d > 0 holds for any 2 (0; + ]. Given d =di < 0, in this case, there is a negative e¤ect of i on rz=w.
Second, it is straightforward to verify that d(rz=w)=d < 0 holds at ! 0 if (A30) is violated. In this case, by substituting = + into (A29), we can show that d(rz=w)=d < 0 also holds at the upper bound, = + , if and only if
We know d 2 (rz t =w t )=d 2 > 0 when < =(1 ). As a result, d(rz=w)=d < 0 holds for any 2 (0; + ]. Given d =di < 0, in this case, there is a positive e¤ect of i on rz=w.
Finally, if (A31) does not hold, there is a threshold value of below (above) which d(rz=w)=d < (>)0; i.e., there is a U-shaped relationship between i and rz=w. Therefore, the e¤ect of i on rz=w can be negative, positive, or U-shaped. Proof of Proposition 3. As in the proof of Proposition 1, we focus on the non-trivial case where~ 1= > 0, implying~ 2 ( ; + ) unless = 0: Recall that 1 < < 1= (1 ) < + . By (29) and (44), we have
By di¤erentiating this with respect to~ ,
where > 0 is a composite variable that is strictly positive. 30 Here, we can derive from (23) and (A23) some components of (~ ) as 30 Here
and
By evaluating these at~ 2 f ; + g and substituting them into (A33), we can obtain
which re ‡ects~ 1= = 0 for~ 2 f ; + g with (30) . For~ = , 1 (~ ) > 0 always holds due to < 1=(1 ), but 2 (~ ) 7 0. For~ = + , both 1 (~ ) < 0 and 2 (~ ) > 0 hold due to
is independent of , and + are also independent of . Thus, changes in a¤ect (A34) only through the second term of 1 . Keeping~ = f ; + g unchanged, it is possible to make (~ ) larger (smaller) as one needs by increasing , since the coe¢cient of 1 ,
, is positive (negative) for~ = (~ = + ). Therefore, for a su¢ciently large ,
32
( ) > 0 and ( + ) < 0 hold; rz=w is …rst increasing and eventually decreasing in~ on the feasible domain of~ . As we already mentioned, by (29) ,~ has another upper bound, , due to i 0. Since, by (29) , is decreasing in and satis…es lim !0 = 1, we can also prove that rz=w …rst increases and eventually decreases with i on the feasible domain of i, by taking an appropriately small value of so that > 1= (1 ). 31 We provide the detailed derivations of (A34) in an unpublished appendix; see Appendix D. 32 It is worth noting that there exists a su¢cient condition for the lower bound of to be less than 1. Note: *** p < 0:01, ** p < 0:05, * p < 0:1. Standard errors are in parentheses. Columns 1 and 4 correspond to the GDP growth rate. Columns 2-3 and 5-6 use di¤erent measures of income inequality. Speci…cally, columns 2 and 5 correspond to the income di¤erence between the top 10% and the bottom 10% of the population. Columns 3 and 6 correspond to the Gini coe¢cient. In the …rst (last) three columns, high-income countries follow the classi…cation by the WIID (WB). The Kleibergen and Paap (2006) rk Lagrange Multiplier (LM) statistic reveals that our strategy passes the under-identi…cation test. Also, the F-statistic of the weak-instrument test is above the critical value in Stock and Yogo (2005) , which suggests that we can reject the weak-instrument hypothesis.
Appendix B: Data and regression results

Appendix C: The generalized model
This appendix presents the key equilibrium conditions for the model with elastic labor supply under the utility function in (54) . Equation (3) is the same, and labor supply is w t (1 L t (h)) = c t (h) (1 + 'i t ) .
The conditional demand functions for labor and intermediate goods are respectively
where L t R 1 0 L t (h) dh. From (C3), the aggregate production function can be derived as
Substituting (C4) into (25), (30) can be revised as follows:
where the condition for~ in (29) 
Based on the CIA constraint b t (h) + 'c t (h) = m t (h), (31) can be revised as
where z t (h) = a t (h) + m t (h). Aggregating (C8) for all h, we have z t = r t z t + w t L t + t (1 + 'i t ) c t .
In this generalized model, we know that s c;t (h) = s c;0 (h) still holds for all t. Given this condition, we combine (C8) and (C9) and use (C1) to derive 
~ 1= (1 + )
in which we have used for ~ 1= 0 (D7) Combining (D3) and (D7) yields (A34).
